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habeas claim. Such an argument would have to persuade the court that
where a defendant has never had an opportunity to present a claim of
constitutional error to a federal court, a more expansive view of the
"miscarriage of justice" exception should be adopted.
Summary and analysis by:
Lesley Meredith James
JENKINS v. COMMONWEALTH
244 Va. 445 423 S.E.2d 360 (1992)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On October 12, 1990, after Arthur Ray Jenkins III and a companion
had become intoxicated at a restaurant and engaged in a fight with a
restaurant patron, family members took Jenkins and his companion from
the scene to his aunt's home where he had been living, along with his
uncle, Floyd Jenkins, age 69, and Lee H. Brinklow, age 72. After
Brinklow attempted to prevent Arthur Jenkins from entering the house,
an argument ensued, and a grisly series of events commenced. Jenkins
shot Brinklow in the face with a.22 rifle, shothis uncle in the head leaving
him on the floor "gagging," and after a short interval outside with
Brinklow, returned to the house, shot his uncle in the head again, and
then, using a butcher knife, stabbed him repeatedly until his "guts came
out." Though Brinklow pled for mercy, Jenkins shot him in the head.t
He then robbed his two victims of their personal items, stole cash and
other valuables from his aunt's bedroom, and left the premises carrying
his two victim's bodies in the back of Brinklow's truck. Jenkins and his
companion abandoned the truck, and after an attempt to clean up the
murder scene, fled the area. Jenkins was apprehended later near
Abingdon.
Jenkins was charged in a multiple count indictment which included:
the capital murder of more than one person as part of the same transac-
tion,2 two counts of capital murder for the killings of Brinklow and
Jenkins in the commission of robbery, 3 two counts of robbery, and two
counts of illegal use of a firearm.4 At trial Jenkins pled guilty to the illegal
use of a firearm in the commission of Brinklow's murder, and the jury
found Jenkins guilty on the remaining charges, including three charges
of capital murder. Jenkins was sentenced to life imprisonment for each
of the robbery convictions and two years imprisonment for the weapons
charge. At the sentencing phase for the capital offenses, the jury
sentenced Jenkins to death for the two remaining capital charges,5 basing
their decision on both the vileness and future dangerousness aggravating
factors.
6
On appeal to -the Virginia Supreme Court, Jenkins presented a
number of arguments centering around the trial court's failure to properly
take into consideration that Jenkins had been sexually abused as a child.
Jenkins argued that some victims of child abuse suffer from a psychologi-
1 Medical examination of the victims indicated Brinklow had
received four gunshot wounds to the head, and the uncle had received two
gunshot wounds in addition to seven stab wounds to the abdomen which
penetrated the body up to eight inches.
2 See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(7) (1990).
3 See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(4) (1990).
4 Jenkins was also charged in the original indictment with the
murder of Brinklow under Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-32, but the prosecutor
cal disorder, "child abuse accommodation syndrome," which, if trig-
gered by the appropriate provocation, followed by a sufficient "heating-
up period," can result in uncontrollable rage. Jenkins alleged that a
suggestive remark made by his uncle caused just such a reaction, and
therefore he should have been charged with manslaughter rather than
capital murder.
In order to support this theory, defense counsel was prepared to
offer the testimony of Dr. Faye Sultan, a North Carolina psychologist,
who had examined Jenkins eight days before trial, and the testimony
of Ronald Mabry, a social worker familiar with Jenkins' case. The trial
court refused to allow Mabry's testimony because the court deemed
his testimony to be part of an improper attempt by defense counsel to
offer a diminished capacity defense in a case where defendant did not
claim to be mentally incompetent. In addition the court held that such
an attempt violated the "Stamper principle," 7 which holds evidence of
the state of mind of the defendant to be irrelevant unless an insanity
defense is mounted. On appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court,
defense counsel argued that in barring Mabry's testimony, the court
was stripping the defendant of the right "to mount a manslaughter
defense."
Unlike Mr. Mabry, Dr. Sultan voluntarily decided not to testify.
Her decision was based on a motion filed by the prosecutor during the
penalty phase, five days into the trial, suggesting that Dr. Sultan could
not properly testify in Virginia because she was not licensed here. The
prosecutor went so far as to allege that should Dr. Sultan testify, she
might be violating Virginia licensing statutes, a criminal violation.
Though the trial court overruled the prosecutor's motion, Dr. Sultan,
after consulting with independent counsel, decided not to risk possible
legal and ethical sanctions by testifying. Defense counsel objected to
the prosecutor's tactic as improper, and suggested that it interfered
with the defendant's constitutional right to present favorable evidence
during the penalty phase of the trial.
Finally, defense counsel alleged that there may have been juror
misconduct. Published accounts after the trial revealed that the foreman
had made a plea for a capital sentence by arguing that if his fellow jurors
failed to impose the death penalty, Jenkins might be released on parole
in as few as ten years. Because this statement is clearly inaccurate, and
subsequently made a motion to nolle prosequi that count.
5 Although the defendant was also convicted of capital murder for
the killing of Floyd Jenkins in the commission of robbery, that charge
was dismissed during the penalty phase upon the Commonwealth's
motion.
6 See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2; § 19.2-264.4(C) (1990).
7 See Stamper v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 707, 717, 324 S.E.2d
682, 688 (1985).
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parole is not a subject properly considered by a jury in Virginia, defense




The Virginia Supreme Court upheld Jenkins' conviction and sen-
tence.9 The court declined to decide whetherJenkins was indeed offering
a diminished capacity defense or whether the proffered defense had
violated the Stamper principle. Rather the court held that "the defendant
was not entitled, under the evidence, to mount a manslaughter de-
fense." 10 The court refused to recognize the "child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome" defense because the "uncontradicted evi-
dence" showed that the murder had not been committed upon sudden
provocation, but was committed with malice and deliberation. 11 The
court found no impropriety in the prosecutor's conduct toward Dr.
Sultan, holding that the maneuver did not violate Jenkins' due process
right to call witnesses in his behalf.12 Finally, the court failed to find
reversible error in the comments made by the jury foreman which
suggested that the jury had improperly considered parole eligibility. 13
The court reiterated the general rule that jury deliberations are only




I. Child Abuse Accommodation Syndrome
After the defendant, Arthur Jenkins, had been examined by Dr.
Sultan, defense counsel attempted during the trial phase to mount a novel
defense similar to that of "battered woman's syndrome." Jenkins'
defense centered around the influence of his childhood experiences of
being sexually abused. He argued that these traumatic experiences
impacted his state of mind at the time of the offense. Normally, under
Virginia case law, state of mind is only relevant if a defendant employs
an insanity defense. 15 However, the defense here wanted to downgrade
8 Jenkins assigned anumberofothererrors. Some ofthese the court
dealt with in a conclusory fashion, while others did not involve death
penalty law or are unlikely to arise often because they revolved around
facts peculiar to the case. These issues will not be discussed in this
summary. Jenkins argued that: (1) the Virginia death penalty statute is
unconstitutional because it is vague, overbroad, and applied in a racially
discriminatory fashion; (2) incriminating statements he made after being
arrested were not admissible because he did not knowingly and voluntar-
ily waive his right to counsel and his privilege against self-incrimination;
(3) the trial court erred in refusing to admit his instructions on intoxica-
tion and second degree murder, (4) the jury should be able to consider
evidence of parole eligibility in the event of a life sentence; and (5) the
sentences were the product of passion orprejudice and are disproportion-
ate to the culpability of the defendant and the nature of the crimes.
9 Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 462 423 S.E.2d 360,
371 (1992).
10 Id. at 457, 423 S.E.2d at 368.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 459,423 S.E.2d at 369. See Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95
(1972) (holding that a fundamental element of due process is a
defendant's right to present witnesses to establish a defense).
13 Jenkins, 244 Va. at 460, 423 S.E.2d at 370.
14 Id.
15 See Stamper v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 707,717,324 S.E.2d
682, 688 (1985).
16 There was some suggestion by witnesses for the prosecution
that the uncle had never sexually abused Jenkins, and that defense
the capital murder charges to manslaughter on the basis that although the
murders seemingly were committed with malice aforethought, they were
actually committed instead after what might be described as delayed
sudden provocation.
Dr. Sultan would have testified that Jenkins suffered from "child
abuse accommodation syndrome," a mental illness suffered by victims of
child abuse. After being reminded in some way of an abusive experience
in the past, a "heating up period" will begin. This period may last an
indeterminate amount of time (usually a day or two) and may culminate in
a fit of rage by the child abuse victim. In this case, Jenkins claimed that a
proposition by his uncle a day or two before the incident triggered his
heating up period.
Clearly, the Virginia Supreme Court was not prepared to accept this
novel defense, especially in light of the facts of this case. 16 The murders
were simply too brutal and deliberate for the court to accept that his actions
could be analogized to actions in the heat of passion. In the absence of an
insanity claim, the court stated that it would not normally consider such a
diminished capacity defense. 17 The court stressed that "'malice and heat
of passion are mutually exclusive; malice excludes passion, and passion
presupposes the absence ofmalice."'I 8 To accept "child abuse accommo-
dation syndrome," the court would have had to make an exception to the
requirement of "sudden provocation" in manslaughter cases. 19
Despite the court's refusal to allow it in attheguiltphase, "child abuse
accommodation syndrome" may turn out to be an effective tool as
mitigating evidence. The United States Supreme Court held in Penry v.
Lynaugh20 that mental retardation and a history of child abuse are valid
mitigating factors. Furthermore, Eddings v. Oklahoma21 forbids limita-
tions which prohibit the sentencer from considering and giving weight to
mitigating evidence through the operation of statutes and evidentiary
rules.22 Defense counsel may be able to fit this disorder within one of the
expressly recognized factors in mitigation enumerated in the Virginia
Code,23 but, in any case, could offer it under the Eighth Amendment right
to introduce any evidence in mitigation, whether or not statutorily
enumerated. 24 The manner in which this evidence would be presented
to the court would be virtually identical to the way one would present
evidence at trial when attempting to reduce murder to manslaughter.
25
counsel had manufactured this defense out of whole cloth. The court
assumed for the sake of argument, however, that defendant's claims
were true. Furthermore, Jenkins' deliberation in carrying out these
attacks, as well as his attempts to clean up the premises certainly
worked against him.
1 7 SeeJenkins, 244 Va. at456, 423 S.E.2d at367 (citing Stamper
v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 707, 717, 324 S.E.2d 682, 688 (1985)).
18 Jenkins, 244 Va. at 457 423 S.E.2d at 368 (quoting Barrett v.
Commonwealth, 231 Va. 102, 106, 341 S.E.2d 190, 192 (1986)).
19 The definition of manslaughter in Virginia is "the unlawful
killing of another without malice. To reduce homicide from murder to
voluntary manslaughter, the killing must have been done in the heat of
passion and upon reasonable provocation." Barrett v. Commonwealth,
231 Va. 102, 105-06, 341 S.E.2d 190, 192 (1986).
20 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
21 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
22 "Just as the state may not by statute preclude the sentencer
from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the state refuse to
consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating factor."Id. at 114.
23 Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.2-264.4(B)(ii), (iv) (1990): "ET]he
capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance" or "at the time
of the commission of the capital felony, the capacity of the defendant
to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law was significantly impaired."
24 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
25 See Hansen, Mitigation: An Outline of Law, Method, and
Strategy, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 29 (1992).
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Before employing the "child abuse accommodation" defense, de-
fense counsel should inquire into this disorder when discussing mental
mitigation with defendant's psychiatric experts. As with many theories
of mitigation, this strategy may work against the defendant if the jury
perceives it as too contrived. However, if presented properly, it could be
an effective argument for the defendant. The most important task for
defense counsel is to explain to the jury the difference between proof at
the trial stage and proof at the penalty phase. Evidence used to prove a
mitigating factor may be misconstrued by the jury as trying to offer a
legal excuse if thejury is not clear on why abifurcated proceeding is used
in capital trials.
II. Coercion of Defense Witnesses by Prosecutor
Jenkins alleged that by warning the defendant's primary expert
witness that she might be criminally prosecuted if she testified, the
prosecutor violated the defendant's due process right to call witnesses
in his defense. The leading case in this area is Webb v. Texas,26 in
which the United States Supreme Court held that a trial judge's
vigorous warnings to a defense witness about the dangers of perjury
amounted to a violation of the defendant's right to present his own
witnesses to establish a defense, because the witness no longer felt that
she could testify freely. Similarly, in United States v. MacCloskey,27
the Fourth Circuit held that a warning by the prosecutor that the
witness "would be well advised to remember the Fifth Amendment"
amounted to improper behavior, and a violation of the defendant's
right to due process.
The Virginia Supreme Court answered Jenkins' argument by first
contending that Dr. Sultan's decision not to testify was a voluntary,
informed decision on her part. However, the fact that Dr. Sultan
ultimately declined to testify seems to be no more "voluntary" than the
decision of a defense witness to invoke the Fifth Amendment after
suggestions from the prosecutor that she may be subject to prosecution
should she testify, which has been held to be a violation of a defendant's
right to due process.
28
Secondly, the court responded that defense counsel should have
moved for a continuance. Though such a move would certainly have
been prudent, the court's response seems inadequate in response to the
questionable maneuvers on the prosecutor's part at a late stage of the
proceedings regarding a crucial witness.
Furthermore, the prosecutor's questionable conduct occurred at a
critical stage for the defendant. Not only were the defendant's due
process rights at stake at this stage, but also his Sixth Amendment right
to effective assistance of counsel and Eighth Amendment right to present
mitigating evidence. Dr. Sultan's decision not to testify effectively
denied Jenkins the opportunity to present mitigating evidence in viola-
tion of Lockett v. Ohio.29 Moreover, because the prosecutor chose to
employ his tactic at the eleventh hour, his actions amounted to a
constructive denial of Jenkins' right to put on competent psychiatric
testimony. As the Court stated in Ake v. Oklahoma:30 "Without a
26 409 U.S. 95 (1972).
27 682 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 1982).
28 See United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3rd Cir. 1976).
29 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
30 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
31 Id. at 85.
32 Jenkins, 244 Va. at 459, 423 S.E.2d at 369.
33 See American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice
Standard 3-1.1(c) (2nd ed. 1982): "The duty of the prosecutor is to seek
justice, not merely to convict."
34 See, e.g., King v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 353,416 S.E.2d 669
(1992), and case summary of King, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No.
psychiatrist's assistance [at the sentencing stage), the defendant cannot
offer a well-informed expert's opposing view and thereby loses a
significant opportunity to raise in the juror's minds questions about the
State's proof of an aggravating factor."3 1 The Virginia Supreme Court's
endorsement of the prosecutor's approach as "an acceptable trial tac-
tic,"'32 sets a dangerous precedent which might lead to a substantial
chilling effect on defendants' ability to present evidence from expert
witnesses. Few professionals will risk criminal prosecution even if the
threat of such prosecution is only suggested through innuendo.
In light of the court's position in Jenkins, defense counsel must
prepare themselves to combat last minute prosecutorial attempts to
discourage testimony by defense witnesses through collateral means.
First of all, should such an issue arise, attorneys should request a
continuance. Considering the court's comment in Jenkins that defense
counsel failed to avail himself of a clear opportunity for a continuance,
Virginia courts facing a similar situation in the future should be amenable
to granting such a request.
Second, defense counsel should employ the various constitutional
arguments available under Webb, Lockett, and Ake. Expert witnesses
who are non-lawyers have no more ability to evaluate the gravity of
possible criminal liability than an ordinary defense witness (who em-
ploys his Fifth Amendment right out of fear that he may be charged with
complicity, for example). Such a strategy should not be considered an
acceptable trial tactic, but rather a denial of due process rights under
Webb. Justice Marshall's opinion in Ake can be used effectively by
pointing out the vital role experts play in marshalling a defense. To make
affirmative attempts to remove a vital actor in the defense team denies the
defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel. Finally, it should
be argued that to use collateral methods to deter a defense witness from
testifying at a critical stage of the proceedings does little to serve the ends
of justice, and therefore are improper.
33
III. Improper Consideration of Parole Evidence by Jury
The Virginia courts have been steadfast in their refusal to allow
juries to consider evidence of parole eligibility or ineligibility during the
penalty phase of a capital trial. 34 The Court in Jenkins again "declined
defendant's invitation to change [its] position on this issue." However,
Jenkins presented the court with an interesting dilemma, because pub-
lished reports after the trial indicated that the jurors had considered
parole as a factor. The court determined that the comments made by the
foreman of thejury about parole eligibility fell within the internal matters
of the juryroom into which courts should not inquire.
35
The scope of Jenkins' holding must be assessed in light of the
Virginia Court of Appeals' holding in Harris v. Commonwealth.36 In
Harris, the court held that a jury's consideration of parole as a factor in
its deliberations was prejudicial to the accused, and overturned the
sentence arrived at by the jury. The Harris court stated: "'The reception
of any evidence by the jury... in addition to that produced at trial is
ground for setting aside the verdict whenever there is sufficient ground
l,p. 37(1992); Watkins v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 341,351,385 S.E.2d
50,56, cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1074 (1989), and case summary of Watkins,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 15 (1989); Hinton v. Common-
wealth, 219 Va. 492, 495, 247 S.E.2d 704, 706 (1978).
But see Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135
(1978). In Smith, the Virginia Supreme Court mentioned the fact that the
defendant "would be in his sixties before he would even be eligible for
parole," as one of a number of mitigating factors argued by the defense,
without remarking on the propriety or impropriety of introducing such
testimony. 219 Va. at 481,248 S.E.2d at 151.
35 Jenkins, 244 Va. at 460, 423 S.E.2d at 367.
36 13 Va. App. 47,408 S.E.2d 599 (1991).
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to believe that... an accused... has been prejudiced by receipt of the
information.' 37 Harris can be construed as holding that even matters
traditionally considered to be internal may be examined by the court in
cases where prejudice to the defendant can be shown. In fact, Harris
holds that courts have an "affirmative duty 'to investigate the charges and
to ascertain whether... as a matter of fact, the jury was guilty of such
misconduct.'
38
Even after Jenkins, the Harris holding may allow inquiry into jury
discussion of parole in certain cases. The court in Harris noted that that
case involved a specific factual assertion by a juror based on particular
personal knowledge, and that it was not a mere assertion of opinion.
Therefore thejury foreman's statement in Jenkins, "Okay in ten years, do
you want your child to run into [the defendant] on the street?" may not
qualify as more than a mere assertion of opinion under Harris.
In light ofHarris, defense counsel should continue to assail Virginia's
prohibition on evidence of parole eligibility at the sentencing phase.
Jenkins offers an opportunity for defense counsel to point out the
hypocrisy of the rule: although juries are told that they may not take
parole eligibility into consideration, case after case, like Jenkins, demon-
strates that there is clear evidence that juries do exactly that.39 Further-
more, defense counsel should take advantage of Harris and consider
having jurors questioned during voir dire about their knowledge of the
parole system, and post-trial to determine whether parole eligibility
37 Id. at 51, 408 S.E.2d at 601 (quoting Commercial Union
hIsurance Co. v. Moorefield, 231 Va. 260, 265, 343 S.E.2d 329, 333
(1986)).
38 Harris, 13 Va. App. at 52, 408 S.E.2d at 601 (quoting Evans-
Smith v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 188, 209, 361 S.E.2d 436, 448
(1987)).
39 See Hood, The Meaning of "Life" for Virginia Jurors and Its
Effect on Reliability in Capital Sentencing, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1605, 1624
(1989) (citing National Legal Research Group, Inc., Jury Research and
entered into their deliberations. It seems unlikely that the Virginia courts
will be able to maintain their bar on parole eligibility evidence if the
defense bar is diligent in pointing out the disparities between the
theoretical foundations upon which the courts depend and the realities of
juror deliberations.
40
IV. Page Limits on Briefs Submitted to Virginia Supreme Court
In his appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, Jenkins' counsel, in
order to stay within the fifty page limit for briefs submitted to that court,
merely referred to the trial transcript, rather than incorporating that
material verbatim into his brief. The court admonished counsel remind-
ing him that "[a] cross-reference to argument made at trial is insuffi-
cient."'4 1 While page limits on appellate briefs clearly serve a useful
purpose, the effectiveness of a defendant's appeal, especially in a capital
trial, should not rest on his counsel's ability to include all arguments
within fifty pages. If defense counsel harbor any doubts about their
ability to stay within the fifty page limit and still effectively make all
arguments, counsel should apply to the court for permission to submit a
lengthier brief. Should the court deny the request, counsel should object
on the constitutional grounds of denial of due process, thereby preserving
a viable federal claim for further appeal.
Summary and Analysis by:
Paul M. O'Grady
Trial Simulation Services, Report on Jurors' Attitudes Concerning the
Death Penalty (Dec. 6, 1988)). See also Paduano and Stafford Smith,
Deathly Errors: Juror Misconceptions Concerning Parole in the Impo-
sition of the Death Penalty, 18 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 211, 221-22 &
nn. 30-34 (1987).
40 For a more extensive discussion of parole eligibility evidence,
see Straube, The Capital Defendant and Parole Eligibility, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol.5, No. 1, p.4 5 (1992).
41 Jenkins, 244 Va. at 461,423 S.E.2d at 370.
LITIGATING THE DEATH PENALTY AND RACE DISCRIMINATION
IN A POST-McCLESKEY WORLD
BY: G. DOUGLAS KILDAY
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1978, an African-American man named Warren McCleskey was
convicted of armed robbery and murder for killing a white police officer
during the robbery of a furniture store.1 McCleskey received a life
sentence for the armed robbery and a death sentence for the murder.
In appealing his convictions and death sentence, McCleskey raised
a fundamental challenge to the Georgia capital sentencing scheme.
McCleskey claimed that the Georgia death penalty was applied in a
racially discriminatory manner in violation of the Fourteenth and Eighth
Amendments. McCleskey relied upon an elaborate statistical study by
Professors David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth
(the "Baldus study") which demonstrated a disparity in the application of
the death penalty based upon the race of the victim. The Baldus study
I McCleskey admitted his role in the robbery, but denied that he was
the one who killed the victim. McCleskey was one of four people who
took part in the robbery.
3 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
3 Indeed, the Court assumed the validity of the Baldus study and
stated that it "demonstrate[d] a risk that the factor of race entered into
isolated and then accounted for thirty-nine variables which could have
explained the disparities on non-race grounds. The study concluded that
defendants charged with killing a white victim are 4.3 times more likely
to be sentenced to death than those charged with killing a black victim.
McCleskey's challenge ultimately was unsuccessful. In a five to
four decision, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the study
proffered by McCleskey was insufficient to show either a Fourteenth
Amendment or an Eighth Amendment violation.
2
Despite the Court's ruling, the unfortunate phenomenon of race
discrimination continues to exist in capital sentencing. 3 This article
will provide an analysis of the McCleskey decision under both the
Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments and then suggest ways that the
capital defense attorney can argue race discrimination in a "post-
McCleskey world."
some capital sentencing decisions" 481 U.S. at 291, n. 7 (emphasis in
original). Further statistical studies have reached the same conclusion as
the Baldus study. See Gen. Gov't Div., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office
Rep. GGD-9, Death Penalty Sentencing: Research Indicates a Pattern
ofRacialDisparities (Feb. 26, 1990) (describing the results of twenty-
eight empirical studies).
